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Control Acronym



System And Communications Protection

CMMC Level


800-171 Control #


CMMC Description

Employ physical and logical isolation techniques in the system and security architecture and/or where deemed appropriate by the organization.

CMMC Clarification

Where the organization deems appropriate they will physically or logically isolate systems containing or processing CUI data from other systems supporting non-CUI business operations. Access controls are implemented to prevent non-authorized users from accessing the networks containing systems hosting and processing CUI information. Example 1 You are the senior IT engineer for your organization and have been asked to install and secure a new server that will be used to store and process CUI data. You create a new VLAN and directly connect the server to that VLAN. Then you configure an Access Control List (ACL) to block that VLAN from getting out to the Internet and only allows the analysts working on the program to have access to that server. Example 2 You are managing a project working on CUI data with two other people. You identify a room and provide only the team members and yourself with keys to access the room. You have the server and a small workgroup switch installed in the room with a couple of workstations. The workgroup switch is not connected to the organization’s network so team members must go to work in the locked room to work on this project.

800-171 Description

800-171 Discussion


Other Source Discussion

DRAFT NIST SP 800-171B Physical and logical isolation techniques applied at the architectural level of the system can limit the unauthorized flow of CUI ● reduce the system attack surface ● constrain the number of system components that must be highly secure ● impede the movement of an adversary. Physical and logical isolation techniques when implemented with managed interfaces, can isolate CUI into separate security domains where additional protections can be applied. Any communications across the managed interfaces (i.e., across security domains), constitutes remote access, even if the communications stay within the organization. Separating system components with boundary protection mechanisms provides the capability for increased protection of individual components and to more effectively control information flows between those components. This type of enhanced protection limits the potential harm from and susceptibility to hostile cyber-attacks and errors. The degree of isolation varies depending upon the boundary protection mechanisms selected. Boundary protection mechanisms include routers, gateways, and firewalls separating system components into physically separate networks or subnetworks ● virtualization and micro-virtualization techniques ● encrypting information flows among system components using distinct encryption keys ● cross-domain devices separating subnetworks ● complete physical separation (i.e., air gaps). Architectural strategies include logical isolation, partial physical and logical isolation, or complete physical isolation between subsystems and at system boundaries between resources that store, process, transmit, or protect CUI and other resources. Examples include: ● Logical isolation: data tagging, digital rights management (DRM), and data loss prevention (DLP) that tags, monitors, and restricts the flow of CUI ● virtual machines or containers that separate CUI and other information on hosts ● virtual local area networks (VLAN) that keep CUI and other information separate on networks. ● Partial physical and logical isolation: physically or cryptographically isolated networks ● dedicated hardware in data centers ● secure clients that: (a) may not directly access resources outside of the domain (i.e., all networked applications execute as remote virtual applications hosted in a DMZ or internal and protected enclave) ● (b) access via remote virtualized applications or virtual desktop with no file transfer capability other than with dual authorization ● or (c) employ dedicated client hardware (e.g., a zero or thin client) or hardware approved for multi-level secure (MLS) usage. Complete physical isolation: dedicated (not shared) client and server hardware, physically isolated, stand-alone enclaves for clients and servers, (a) logically separate network traffic (e.g., using a VLAN) with end-to-end encryption using PKIbased cryptography, or (b) physically isolate it from other traffic. Isolation techniques are selected based on a risk management perspective that balances the threat, the information being protected, and the cost of the options for protection. Architectural and design decisions are guided and informed by the security requirements and selected solutions. NIST SP 800-160-1 provides guidance on developing trustworthy secure systems using systems security engineering practices and security design concepts.

CIS Control References

CIS Controls v7.1 14.1

NIST 800-53 Control Ref.

CMMC Derived

NIST CSF Control References

NIST 800-171 References

Applicable FAR Clause

NIST CSF Control Reference


CERT RMM Reference

Modification of NIST 800-171B Reference

CMMC modification of Draft NIST SP 800-171B 3.13.4e

NIST 800-171B Reference

UK NCSCCyber Reference

AS ACSC Reference


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